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The poor performance of macroeconomic models during the great recession of 2008 has 
forced many economists to re-examine macroeconomic theories, and search for creditable 
alternatives to the popular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. This 
paper derives a new macroeconomic model from recently published Fundamental 
Equation of Economics (FEOE) and applies the new model to answer a general question 
what causes economic crises. The macro model known as the indeterministic balance 
sheet plus (IBS+) model proposed in this paper for the first time turns out to be a special 
breed of accounting models. Different accounting models are more or less same in the 
way of handling empirical accounting data and flow of funds, and different in the way of 
forecasting the future. The IBS+ macroeconomic model takes the indeterministic view of 
the future balance sheets with the emphasis on probabilistic causalities, tail risks, 
economic reality described by balance sheet accounting, truthfully capturing the sectorial 
flow of funds and dynamics of economics, universally applicability, and a rock solid 
scientific theoretical foundation. The IBS+ model is very different from the popular 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and agent-based computational 
economic (ACE) models. Through a side by side comparison, we prove that IBS+ model 
is superior to DSGE or ACE models in many ways. This paper concludes that DSGE 
models are probably intellectual dead ends, and economists should stop investing heavily 
with DSGE models and instead should replace DSGE models with IBS+ models. 
Economic crises have plagued humanity since the dawn of capitalism. Despite intense 
studies over last several hundred years, the questions about causes, forecasting, and 
prevention of economic crises remains unsolved. This paper proposes a classification of 
causes of economic crises using IBS+ models to analyze balance sheets of key economic 
sectors. Applying this classification to examine recent economic crises, we conclude that 
most economic crises are caused by mismanagement of balance sheets by key economic 
players. This paper suggests that economic crises are largely caused by inevitable 
misbehavior of humanity and not caused by any fundamental flaw of capitalism. Just like 
improving the individual health and personal hygiene is the key to prevent epidemic 
diseases in societies, the key to prevent future economic crises is to promoting financial 
disciplines and strengthening risk management of key players in economics. Because 
some economic crises can be caused by natural and man-made factors beyond the scope 
of economics like earthquakes and wars, the frequency of economic crises can be 
minimized by proper risk management practices but economic crises can never be 
completely eliminated. Historically, treating mismanagement of balance sheets as main 
causes of economic crises is a generalization of Austrian business cycle theory, Fisher’s 
debt deflation theory, and Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. 
1. Introduction 
 
A forecasting model in science requires the model to be logically self-consistent, 
making forecast with reasonable accuracy, truthful abstraction of initial reality, capturing 
key dynamics accurately, and based on a sound theoretical foundation.  
For example, Sir Isaac Newton proposed a solar system model in his book 
Principia based on laws of motion and law of gravity. Newton’s model is an excellent 
example of what a scientific forecasting model should be. We are still using Newton’s 
model today except that we are now using differential equations, which is mathematically 
equivalent to Newton’s highly sophisticated geometric derivations. 
Another example is Bohr model of atoms [1, 2]. Bohr model has all features of a 
scientific model except it has a weak theoretical foundation. Bohr proposed his atom 
model in 1913 while the full-blown quantum mechanics was established much later in 
1925.  Bohr model is a landmark achievement in the history of science. Even though 
Bohr model can give some highly accurate forecasts about Hydrogen atoms, we no longer 
use Bohr model today because it lacks a sound theoretical foundation by today’s modern 
physics standard.  
Should we hold the same scientific standard for forecasting models in social 
science? The central point of this paper is that we should because we can meet the same 
scientific standard with Physics Laws of Social Science (PLSS) [3, 4] and Fundamental 
Equation of Economics (FEOE) [5]. This paper shows that many popular forecasting 
models in macroeconomics like DSGE and ACE models are falling well short of the 
above scientific standard. The macroeconomic model that does meet the standard, which 
is proposed in this paper for the first time, is a special version of accounting models. 
The second and third sectors of this paper describe the short outlines of PLSS and 
FEOE, which have been published earlier [3,4,5], in order to benefit the readers by 
making this paper more or less self-contained. The fourth sector derives a 
macroeconomic model from FEOE, and then we discuss many topics related to 
macroeconomic modeling. The fifth sector applies the macroeconomic model to analyze 
the causes of economic crises, which has been a long standing problem of economics. 
The last sector is the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Five Physics Laws of Social Science 
 
The starting point of scientifically answering fundamental questions in economics 
is the five physics laws of social science, which have been published elsewhere in a book 
[3] and an academic paper [4]. For the benefit of readability of this paper, we re-list five 
physics laws of social science in the following. 
 
First Law – Law of Indeterminacy 
 
For a closed system, the outcome of any future event in the system is 
indeterministic. The quantum uncertainty of the future is the fundamental 
property of nature and cannot be overcome by any means. 
 
Second Law – Law of Prediction  
 
For a closed system, any future event in the system can be and can only be 
predicted precisely to the extent of a joint probability distribution among all 
possible outcomes. The joint probability distribution function exists and is 
uniquely given by quantum mechanics. 
 
Third Law – Law of Choice  
 
Actions, which are constrained by fundamental laws of physics, can be taken 
between time 0 and time T to modify the joint probability distribution function of 
time T of a closed system. 
 
Fourth Law – Law of Information 
 
The complete historic information of any closed system cannot be recreated based 
on today’s complete information. At any time step, new information is created 
and some historic information is lost permanently. 
 
Fifth Law – Law of Equilibrium 
 
For a system under certain constrains, quantum uncertainties in the system will 
eventually push the system toward equilibrium states. 
 
The explanation and discussion of these five laws can be found in the book [3] 
and the paper [4]. These laws are fundamental laws of physics, which are applicable to 
any system including any physical and biological systems, and human societies. 
Fundamental equation of economics is one application of these physics laws in 
economics. 
 
3. Fundamental Equation of Economics 
 
The details about Fundamental Equation of Economics can be found in the paper 
[5]. Fundamental Equation of Economics is the mathematical bridge connecting the 
current economic reality with all the future possibilities. Let φ be the unique and 
objective joint probability distribution function, law of prediction translates into the 




  = H φ 
 
Here H is an operator. In principal, for a closed system of human behavior and 
human society, H operator is precisely defined by quantum mechanics. At this stage, we 
do not know to define H exactly starting the atomic level interactions. However, we do 
know that H operator does exist and is uniquely defined because of law of prediction. For 
all practical purpose, as long as H exists and is uniquely defined, we could always 
construct an approximate H operator from empirical data and physics laws, then compare 
the forecast against the future outcome. The difference between the outcome and 
expectation provides the needed feedback to further improve the forecasting models. The 
initial condition φ(t=0) reflects the existing economic reality. The Feynman-Kac equation 
for the option pricing theory can be viewed as a special case of FEOE.  
For most applications of FEOE in economics, we can further specify the joint 
probability distribution function φ. In economics, we mainly concern about monetary 
matters. Since money always belongs to somebody with free wills, in most applications, 
the joint probability distribution function φ is simply the joint probability of possible 
values of assets in balance sheets. Therefore, FEOE describes the time evolution of the 
joint probability distribution of future valuation of assets and liabilities. The initial 
condition φ(t=0) reflects the economic reality of the existing assets and liabilities.  
We must emphasize that FEOE and quantum economics is far more than just 
applying probability theory for the economic analysis. In physics, quantum mechanics is 
far more than just applying probability theory for the physics analysis. In the FEOE 
framework, the future joint probability distribution function is unique and objective, and 
can be forecasted precisely only at one moment. FEOE is the generalized Born’s 
statistical interpretation in the human society.  
 
4. A Macroeconomic Model Derived from Fundamental Equation of Economics 
 
In this section, we first derive the indeterministic balance sheet Plus (IBS+) model 
for macroeconomics from physics laws of social science and the fundamental equation of 
economics. We show that IBS+ models to be universally applicable in any kind of 
economy, making forecasts with reasonable accuracy, truthful abstraction of reality, 
capturing dynamics accurately, and based on a sound theoretical foundation.  Throughout 
this section, we make the side-by-side comparison between the popular dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium DSGE and IBS+ models to prove that IBS+ models are 
superior in many ways and DSGE models fail short as a scientific forecasting model.  
  
4.1 Indeterministic Balance Sheet Plus (IBS+) Model 
 
The word “indeterministic” means that IBS+ models take indeterministic view of 
the future. On the theoretical side, the entire framework of physics laws of social science 
and FEOE is built on the concept of quantum indeterminancy. On the empirical side, 
macroeconomic phenomena are clearly indeterministic. For example, a macroeconomic 
shock of unknown magnitude was prevented in 1998 when a hedge fund known as Long-
Term Capital Management was rescued by a group of major banks under the supervision 
of Federal Reserve. During financial crisis of 2008, investment bank Bear Sterns was 
rescued while Lehman Brothers was ordered to file bankruptcy. The failure of Lehman 
Brothers certainly brought the severity of the financial crisis into a new level. If financial 
giants Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG were allowed to file bankruptcy, the path of 
macroeconomics would be certainly very different. In China, the central government 
activated massive stimulus programs in 2008 and 2009 to allow Chinese economy to 
avoid a recession. All these events were results of indeterministic conscious choices by 
economic players. Thus if the fundamental feature of macroeconomic phenomena are 
indeterministic, a scientific forecasting model of macroeconomics must be 
indeterministic. 
The word “balance sheet” means that IBS+ models use the balance sheet view of 
an economy. There are many perspectives of overall economy activities. National 
product, income, consumption, flow of funds, aggregated supply and demand, and 
aggregated balance sheets are all related and useful measures. However, for the 
forecasting purpose, FEOE firmly favors the balance sheet view of the economy for many 
reasons: (1) The ownership of productive properties is critical to understand of an 
economy. Balance sheets are owned by some people. When owners of balance sheets 
make choices with their free wills, it generates the indeterministic behavior of 
macroeconomics. Directly modeling choices in real economics allows IBS+ to avoid the 
artificial micro-foundations used in DSGE models. (2) The ownership structure of some 
economy is not always straight forward because the idea of respecting the private 
ownership is not universally shared in many countries. For example, officially largest 
banks in China are publicly traded companies and owned by shareholders. However, key 
lending and other key decisions of these largest banks are directed by the central 
government. Understanding these complicated ownership relationships are critical for 
modeling and forecasting Chinese economy. (3) Mismanagement of balance sheets is 
fundamental to understanding and forecasting economic crises. Mismanagement of 
balance sheets could result in bankruptcy, wastes, loan defaults, bad investments, 
liquidity crises, and many other economic hardships. (4) According to FEOE, the balance 
sheets play fundamental roles in economics. Balance sheets are fundamental economic 
units just like cells are basic units of biology and molecules are basic units of chemistry. 
(5) With the balance sheet view of economy, many other alternatives views are included 
in the background. In terms of stock flow terminology, balance sheet items are stocks 
while incomes and expenses are flows. To forecast the stock, the flow information is 
implied naturally. 
The word “plus” means IBS+ models might need additional variables to a list of 
assets and liabilities on balance sheets depending the goals and designs of models. The 
accounting view of an economy is incomplete because there is considerable amount of 
relevant economic information that is not included by the normal balance sheet 
accounting. For example, while demographic information is essential for forecasting the 
employment rate, demographic data is not parts of regular balance sheet accounting. 
Another example, one way to look at an economy is that the economy could be viewed as 
collections of hundreds of interconnected markets, like housing markets, labor markets, 
etc. The market dynamics of these hundreds of markets is only partially captured by the 
balance sheet accounting. If some important markets like labor and housing market need 
to be explicitly included in the overall forecasting model, we have to apply 
indeterministic demand supply pricing (ISDP) models [5] to add these market forecasts.  
 To derive a macroeconomic model from FEOE is very straight forward. Choose a 
set of state variables that completely describe an economy. The definition of complete 
sets varies with goals of the models. And then construct the joint probability density for 
all future possible states.  
Consider an economy consists of a set of balance sheets with different items of 
assets and liabilities. In order to limit the complexity of an IBS+ model, only key sectors, 
assets, and liabilities are carefully chosen, and less important sectors, assets and liabilities 
are grouped into related aggregates.  
Let 𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡) be the monetary value of asset/liability j in the balance sheet i at time t.  
For a IBS+ model, 𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡) will be called state variables because the state of an economy is 
uniquely defined by these variables. According to the law of prediction, the probability 
density function for the future value of each asset/liability f(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡))  exits and precisely 
predictable.  
For many macro applications, the balance sheet view of an economy is not 
complete without additional k state variables labeled as 𝑏𝑘(𝑡). For example, the future 
employment rate depends on economic activities, which are captured by the balance sheet 
accounting, and demographic dynamics, which is not part of the balance sheet 
accounting. At least two additional state variables working population 𝑏1(𝑡) and the size 
labor force 𝑏2(𝑡) are needed to model the future unemployment rate. Again according to 
the law of prediction, the probability density function for each additional state variable 
g(𝑏𝑘(𝑡))  exits and precisely predictable.  
For some applications, the joint probability density function for all state variables 
J(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝑏𝑘(𝑡)) need to be forecasted. The joint the probability density function captures 
all correlation relations between state variables. 
To be consistent with FEOE, the IBS+ forecasting model is only complete with 
the predicted probability density functions for all state variables f(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡)) ,  g(𝑏𝑘(𝑡)) , and 
J(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝑏𝑘(𝑡)) . Mathematically, the joint probability density function J(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡), 𝑏𝑘(𝑡)) 
is logically related with the margin probability density function f(𝑎𝑖𝑗(𝑡))  and 
g(𝑏𝑘(𝑡)) through copula functions. 
 
4.2 A Simple Example of IBS+ Model for the World Economy 
 
In this section, we will construct a simple macroeconomic model for the overall 
world economy as an illustration of the basics of IBS+ model. The simple goal for this 
model is to forecast the range of the possible sizes of the world economy 10 years from 
today. 
The first step is to choose a set of state variables. The IBS+ model takes the 
balance sheet view of the overall world economy. The world economy can be viewed as 
one single aggregated balance sheet with all debts and derivative contracts in the world 
are cancelled out, and the remaining items on the balance sheets are assets like physical 
factories, buildings, gold bars, and etc. Since the task of modeling is to forecast 
scientifically how this world balance sheet grows and shrinks in next 10 years, to make it 
simple, we just aggregate all assets on the world economy balance sheet into one variable 
w, which is the net worth of the overall world economy. 
The second step is to forecast the probability density distribution function of w for 
next 10 years.  
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡−1 +  𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑡 +  𝑐𝑔𝑡  
𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑡 = 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 −  𝑃𝑡  
Where 𝑤𝑡 is the world net worth at the end of period of time t, 𝑤𝑡−1 the world net 
worth at the end of previous period of time t-1,  𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑡 and 𝑐𝑔𝑡 the saving and capital gains 
during the period of time t, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡 the world GDP and total world consumption 
during the period of time t.  
For the sake of simplicity, we choose the saving rate, GDP growth rate, and the 
capital appreciation rate as three exogenous stochastic variables of the model, which can 
be determined empirically using the autoregressive method to capture the short 
momentum and the historic probability distributions. Now the IBS+ model is completely 
defined and the probability density distribution function of w for next 10 years can be 
computed numerically. 
This simple model does satisfy the requirement of a scientific forecasting model 
which must be logically self-consistent, making forecasts with reasonable accuracy, 
truthful abstraction of initial reality, and based on a sound theoretical foundation, with the 
exception of failure of capturing dynamics accurately. The true dynamics of the world 
economy is too complicated for a simple model to capture.  
For comparison, we could easily construct the simple IS-LM model [6] for the 
overall world economy, which is essentially a simplified version of popular DSGE 
models. However, we cannot say the IS-LM model satisfies the requirement of a 
scientific forecasting model. (1) IS-LM model treats the world economy as a state of 
static general equilibrium, which is not true at all. The world economy is constantly 
growing for most parts with few occasions of recessions. (2) Key causality relationships 
predicted by IS-LM are usually wrong empirically. For example, IS-LM says that the 
lower interest rate generates higher GDP growth. In recent years, most major economies 
in the world had record lows of interest rates. Yet we have seen below average growth 
rates of the world GDP. Many economists [6] use the recession of 1981 as a successful 
application of IS-LM model. However, IS-LM model provided no insight why it worked 
sometimes and did not in other time. (3) The IS-LM model has a shaky theoretical 
foundation of general equilibrium theory, which is not compatible with FEOE. (4) Most 
importantly, the IS-LM model is not based on anything from economic reality or 
empirical data. It is simply an economic fairy tale. Just like the ancient Greeks used the 
Sun god to describe movements in the solar system. For the world economy, the 
economic reality and empirical data are captured fully by the aggregated balance sheet of 
the world economy. (5) One of original model creators John Hicks later criticized the IS-
LM models [7] “I accordingly conclude that the only way in which IS-LM analysis 
usefully survives – as anything more than a classroom gadget.” and “When one turns to  
questions of policy, looking toward the future instead of the past, the use equilibrium 
methods is still more suspect.” Unfortunately, IS-LM models continue to dominate the 
macroeconomic classrooms all over the world. Even world famous economists [8] are 
still formally applying IS-LM model to make serious policy recommendations. 
 
4.3 Brief History of Accounting Models 
 
The accounting view of economics is not something new. Our ancestors invented 
numbers in order to quantify food and other properties, which was the accounting view of 
their local economy. A 76,000 years-old engraved ocher plaque, discovered in South 
Africa, was considered by some researchers [9] as the earliest example of accounting in 
the ancient world. 
When he criticized mercantilism in The Wealth of Nation in 1776, Adam Smith 
was taking an accounting view of economy and he said “the division of labor is the great 
cause of the increase of public opulence, which is always proportioned to the industry of 
the people, and not to the quantity of gold and silver as is foolishly imagined”. In other 
words, Adam Smith correctly pointed out the wealth of a nation was the productive 
capacity of the country enhanced by the division of labor, which usually vastly 
outweighed the value of gold and silver of that nation. Translating Adam Smith’s verb 
description into the language of mathematics, it becomes the equation 
𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡−1 +  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡 +  𝑐𝑔𝑡  
which is the same equation that we used to describe the world economy equation. It is 
interesting to note that this accounting equation itself is simple but timeless much like 
Maxwell equations for electromagnetism. Adam Smith did not think this simple idea (or 
equation) was trivial. Otherwise, Adam Smith would not have devoted much of his book 
on the topic and put the title his book as “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations”. The accounting view of economy was further developed by the 18th 
century economist Jean Baptiste Say in his work “A Treatise on Political Economy”. 
The systematic and quantitative accounting view of economies was not developed 
until 1920s and 1930s pioneered by Colin Clark [10] and Simon Kuznets [11]. During the 
World War II, Richard Stone, who was a student of Colin Clark, worked with James 
Meade under the supervision of John Keynes [10] to create an accounting framework of 
how to pay for the war effort of the UK. The first national account for the UK was 
published 1941. After the War II, the national accounts for many countries were created. 
The first national account for the US was published in 1947. Today, the national 
accounting system is the bedrock of modern economics, and more or less reflects the 
reality of the world economics in a scientific way that is independent of value systems 
and political ideologies. The open challenge for economists is how to extend these 
empirical measurements into the forecast of the future in a scientific manner, and how to 
improve the empirical measurements to make them even more relevant, accurate, and 
scientific. 
Naturally, the nation accounting system becomes the starting point of virtually all 
macroeconomic forecasting models with the noticeable exception of the IS-LM model. 
Combining with time series analysis, empirical forecasting models like traditional 
structural econometric model (SEM) were created [12-14]; marrying empirical analysis 
with neoclassical economic theories, Real Business Cycle Theory [15-17], and new 
Keynesian [18-23], DSGE models were built; taking advantage of the power of computer 
simulation, agent-based computational economic (ACE) models were developed [24-25]. 
Stock-flow Consistent (SFC) macroeconomic models pays close attention of flow 
of funds. Morris A. Coperland was credited to develop in 1949 [26] the quadruple-entry 
system to trace flow of funds of sectors of US economy.  However, the work of 
Coperland did not lead to a macroeconomic forecasting model many years later until 
James Tobin [27], Wynne Godley [28-31], and their colleagues [32-40] in 1980s. Over 
years, Stock-flow Consistent (SFC) models have become a creditable alternative to 
general equilibrium macroeconomic models. However, equilibrium models like DSGE 
remain dominant in textbooks, academics, central banks, investment banks, and 
government agencies with strong institutional supports, because equilibrium models fit 
comfortably with mainstream neoclassical theories of economics. SFC models are 
distinctly non-neoclassical as Wynne Godley called them “macroeconomics without 
equilibrium and disequilibrium” [29]. For years, SFC models largely remain on fringes of 
academic economics with only a small group of followers [41-42]. 
The situation started to change after the great recession of 2008. It was very 
difficult for mainstream economists and DSGE modelers to find excuses for failure to 
forecast and model such a monumental economic event like the great recession of 2008. 
Surprisingly, despite a relatively small group of modelers, Bezemer pointed out [41-42] 
that several SFC modelers Godley from 1999 to 2006 [31,33-35], Godley and Lavoie in 
2007 [36-38], Keen in 2006 [43], and Hudson in 2006 [44-45] have successfully 
forecasted the great recession of 2008 to different degrees of accuracy and scope. In 
contrast, almost no one among hundreds and thousands of neoclassical economists and 
DSGE modelers foresaw the worst recession since the great depression [41, 42]. Even 
among few mainstream economists like Shiller [46-47] and Roubini [48] did forecast the 
recession, their reasoning was based the consequence of housing bubble bursts and had 
nothing to do with neoclassical economic theories or DSGE modeling. 
From the above short description of the history of accounting models, it is crystal 
clear that accounting models should be the truly orthodox of economics. In past decades, 
economics made an unfortunately wrong turn [49-53] by combining the scientific 
national accounting system with the unscientific neoclassical economic theories to 
produce equilibrium models like IS-LM and DSGE models. This paper proposes that the 
right approach to macroeconomics is to combine the scientific national accounting 
system with the FEOE to build scientific IBS+ macroeconomic models.  
In the historic prospective, IBS+ models share many common grounds with non-
neoclassical models like SEM and SFC models. The sharp difference is that IBS+ models 
emphasize the FEOE framework, indeterminacy, and the balance sheet views of the 
economy, while SEM and SFC models are deterministic in nature. 
 
4.4 Accounting as a Field of Science 
 
Although accounting is as ancient as the numbers, and the numbers has grown 
into one of the humanity proudest intellectually achievement: mathematics, accounting 
remains remain largely the same through ages with the exception of the invention 
bookkeeping system. So is accounting a field of science? The world largest accountant 
organization does not think so. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
defines accounting as “the art of recording, classifying, and summarizing in a significant 
manner and in terms of money, transactions and events which are, in part at least, of 
financial character, and interpreting the results thereof.”  
 Accounting serves many purposes like taxation, financial reporting, and 
forecasting. This paper asserts that if accounting is used for forecasting purposes under 
the framework of physics laws of social science and fundamental equation of economics, 
then accounting is a field of science because forecasting the future in any field is physics. 
This might explain why accounting is such a universal language for business. To define 
accounting as a science is important because it sets an interesting new value-free standard 
of accounting which requires accounting to describe truthfully the economic reality in the 
same way that rulers measure the spacing and clocks measure the time in physics. 
National accounting system is a good example of scientific accounting. A good 
scientific forecasting model should provide valuable feedbacks to new measurement, 
more precise measurement, and measurement provides new data for better theories and 
the foundation of better forecasting. The scientific process of the positive feedback 
between forecasting and measurement, which has been working wonderfully in physics 
since Galileo’s Leaning Tower of Pisa experiment in 1589, should also work well in 
accounting and economic forecasting.   
 
4.5 The Fundamental Question of Macroeconomics  
 
In next few sections, we compare an IBS+ model and a DSGE model side-by-
side.  
Before building any macroeconomic model, one question must be confronted 
first: what is predictable and what is not predictable in macroeconomics? The question is 
so important logically that this paper calls it the fundamental question of 
macroeconomics, because the answer to this question largely defines the basic structure 
and methodology of a macroeconomic model.  
Is recession predictable? For DSGE models, the answer is no. DSGE models 
regard recessions as exogenous shocks. In other words, by design, DSGE models are 
blind to developing high-tech bubbles, credit bubbles, stock market bubbles, housing 
bubbles, excessive government debt, and other dangerous economic imbalances. 
Therefore, to use DSGE models to guide the government monetary policies is like to ask 
a blind to drive a school bus.  
Are key macroeconomic indicators predictable? Most existing macroeconomic 
models including DSGE, SEM, and SFC models believe that key macroeconomic 
indicators like unemployment rate and inflation rate are predictable deterministically. For 
standard DSGE models, the stochastic behavior comes only from the exogenous shocks.  
 In an IBS+ model, the probabilities of future recessions are predictable. The joint 
probability distribution function of the key macroeconomic indicators is precisely 
predictable according to FEOE while the precise values of key macroeconomic indicators 
are not predictable.  
If a model tries to predict the unpredictable and ignore the predictable, the model 
is doomed to failure. The indeterminacy embedded in the macroeconomic dynamics is 
the fundamental reason that explains why it has been so hard to forecast precise values of 
key macroeconomic indictors. 
  
4.6 A Model Universally Applicable 
 
One remarkable feature of a IBS+ model is that the model are universally 
applicable to any kind of economy from Robinson Crusoe economy to City of Detroit, 
State of New York, North Korean, Cuban, Chinese, Japanese, European, and US 
economy. The reason of universality is simply because the balance sheet analysis is 
fundamental to any economic entity.  
By comparison, it has found very difficult [54] to extend DSGE models for 
economies like North Korea, China, and other emerging economies because of the 
idiosyncratic economic structures and poorly developed market economy in these 
countries. By design, assumptions of DSGE models are very restrictive because the 
general equilibrium and AD/AS framework limit the applicability to mature market-based 
economies. And the poor performance during the great recession of 2008 has proven that 
DSGE models also did not work well for these mature economies either.  
 
4.7 A Model with Falsifiable Predictions 
 
Whether an economic model is falsifiable and how to falsify an economic model 
are fundamental questions in economics. Yet these questions are very controversial. Do 
the poor performance of DSGE models during the great recession of 2008 really mean 
these models are falsified and economists should abandon these models? Because Federal 
Reserve has to disclose their economic forecasting publically, their forecasts were often 
found far off the acceptable marks. For example, in an addendum to Fed minutes of 
October 2007, just a few months before the start of one of the worst recession in history, 
Fed forecasters were expecting the economy to grow 1.8 to 2.5% in 2008. Should Federal 
Reserve throw out their forecast models? In reality, Federal Reserve is still using more or 
less the same models today and will use them in the foreseeable future. 
Physics Laws of Social Science and Fundamental Equations of Economy shine 
some lights on these difficult and controversial questions. An IBS+ model is falsifiable. 
However, because the forecast by an IBS+ model is the probability density of an 
economic variable, the falsifying process is more complicated and requires many 
repeated observations.  
Take the rock-paper-scissor game as a simple example. Let’s say the forecast by 
FEOE is one-third probability for each three outcome. A different deterministic model 
would forecast a pre-determined sequence of moves with 100% confidence. These two 
forecasting model are falsifiable with the relative entropy measures from the information 
theory with sufficient repeated observations. 
 
4.8 A Model Forecasting both Tail Risks and Statistical Averages 
 
One most important feature of an IBS+ model is its ability to forecast both tail 
risks and the statistical averages. The tail risk is simply the tail portion of the probability 
density distribution and the statistical average is the mean of the probability distribution 
in an IBS+ model. In macroeconomics, the tail risks and statistical averages often have 
very different dynamics. Therefore, it is critically important to forecast both of them 
accurately.  
For example, when the congress failed to reach an agreement to raise debt ceiling 
limit in early November 2013, the tail risk of a severe recession in 2014 rose 
significantly. The financial markets started to react with selling off the treasury bills at 
risks of default, and the financial market volatility shot higher. However, the risk of a 
severe recession in 2014 is very small because most likely the congress would act before 
pushing the country to default its debt obligation. Therefore, the forecasts of statistical 
averages of key economic growth indicators should be barely impacted by the temporary 
failure of the congress to reach an agreement to raise the debt ceiling.  
Take another example. At the end of 2006, the US economy was doing fine with 
few signs of imbalances. It is perfectly natural for a macro model to forecast rosy 
averages of economic growth indicators for both 2007 and 2008. It was very difficult to 
foresee a severe recession was coming in 2008 at the end of 2006 from the statistical 
averages. However, it was not difficult to see the tail risks of a recession rising rapidly at 
the end of 2006 because the US housing market peaked in early 2006, and much more 
importantly the early-payment-defaults of subprime mortgages rose alarmingly in the 
second half of 2006.  
Most economists are familiar with Paul Samuelson’s comment on the ability of 
the stock market to predict the recessions. In 1966, Paul Samuelson famously said, “The 
stock market has forecast nine of the last five recessions.” While many economists took 
this Samuelson’s quote as a way to dismiss the forecasting power of the equity market, 
from the tail risks point of view, Samuelson’s observation makes perfect sense because 
by the tail risk is not about 100% certainty of recession going to happen by the definition, 
the macroeconomic events are indeterministic in nature, and financial markets are 
sensitive to both tail risks and statistical averages of economic forecasts is fundamentally 
important for a macro model to have both endogenous and exogenous uncertainties. The 
cores of DSGE models are deterministic and uncertainties are exogenous. Comparing 
with IBS+ models, Lack of endogenous uncertainties and instability is a major weakness 
of DSGE models. 
 
4.9 A Model Based on Initial Reality 
 
Like any forecasting model in physics, the initial condition plays a key role in an 
IBS+ model. Because there are usually significant amount of uncertainties in the 
economic forecasting and any historic relationships except laws of physics are not certain 
to hold in the future, the initial reality becomes only thing we can be 100% certain in any 
economic forecasting. In an IBS+ model, the initial reality is the initial balance sheet of 
the economy.  
 DSGE models are also able to start with the empirical data from the initial 
accounting data of balance sheets of key sectors. That is a key advantage and strength of 
DSGE models comparing to static equilibrium models. However, the choice of sectors in 
DSGE models is very limited. By design, DSGE models could not take advantage of 
more detailed information of the initial reality. For example, financial sectors were often 
ignored in many DSGE models.  Without financial sectors, it is impossible to forecast 
many financial crises.  
 
4.10 A Model Capturing Economic Dynamics Accurately 
 
One remarkable feature of an IBS+ model is its flexibility to select key sectors 
and assets to be modeled. In a different economic environment or different economy, key 
sectors could be very different. In the 2001 recession, the key sectors are high-tech and 
telecommunication. In the great recession of 2008, the key sectors are housing, mortgage 
finance, auto, and financial services. For Chinese economy of 2013, the key sectors are 
housing, shadow banking system, banking, and regional governments. Without detail 
information of key sectors, it is impossible to model economic dynamics accurately.  
A fatal flaw of DSGE models is their inability to include arbitrary economic key 
sectors. When we use the AS-AD framework and micro-foundation with one consumer 
and one firm, most sector-level details must be ignored. Without accurately capturing 
dominating economic dynamics of key economic sectors, a macro forecasting model 
cannot be taken seriously. For example, it is impossible to model Chinese economy 
realistically without capturing the dynamics of housing and the key shadow banking 
system. However, there is no natural place for the shadow banking system in DSGE 
models. For the US economy, with a framework of one consumer and one firm in DSGE 
models, there would be no room for subprime mortgage borrowers and lenders. Yet 
during the great recession of 2008, it was the early payment defaults of subprime 
mortgages in late 2006 that led to the collapse of the subprime lenders like New Century 
and Option One Mortgage in early 2007, which started the chain reaction of a vicious 
cycle of downturn.  
DSGE models ignore relevant sector details, and UK economist Charles Goodhart 
noted in an interview in 2009 that “Everything that a central bank ought to be interested 
in was excluded from the model.” 
  
4.11 A Model Emphasizing Realistic Decision Making Not Artificial 
Microfoundation 
 
One of central tenets of any DSGE model is its microfoundation. However, the 
assumption that the maximization of utility by consumers and the maximization of profits 
by firms is over-simplification and unrealistic. 
Since IBS+ models deal with the balance sheets of real economic sectors, the 
behavior of decision making is founded on the average behavior of the real economic 
agents.  
For example, one hallmark feature during the financial panics like the Great 
Recession of 2008 is that the leaders of firms are rushing to deleverage approximately at 
the same time. This kind of self-preservation behavior of firms cannot be described by 
the profit maximization. 
 
4.12 A Model Avoiding Fallacy of Division and Composition 
 
During the great recession of 2008,  the balance sheets of financial giants AIG, 
Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac became major sources of 
macroeconomic instability for the US and world economy. However, the aggregated 
balance sheet of all US insurance companies including AIG looked fairly healthy while 
the default of AIG alone was sufficient to push the US recession to a whole new level of 
severity. Therefore, in order to capture the downturn risks of US economy accurately, the 
balance sheet of AIG must be separated from other healthier insurance companies. The 
fallacy of division is to use the healthiness of whole insurance industry to conclude that 
insurance companies would not have caused economic instability. The fallacy of 
composition is to use the troubles of AIG to conclude that whole insurance industry were 
bankrupt. It is very easy to commit logic fallacies when making conclusions by 
combining assets and balance sheets. 
When taking the balance sheet views of an economy in an IBS+ model, on one 
hand we have to choose as fewest sectors and fewest assets as possible in order to keep 
the model simple, and on the other hand we have to make sure that we would not commit 
the fallacy of division and composition when grouping assets, companies, and industries 
into aggregation.  
DSGE models with a framework of one consumer and one firm is nearly 
impossible to avoid the fallacy of division and composition. Therefore, standard DSGE 
models cannot properly handle endogenous instabilities caused by consumers and firms. 
 
4.13  A Model Emphasizing Institutional Economics 
 
Since a standard DSGE model has a framework of one consumer and one firm, it 
is impossible to include important insights from institutional economics. However, the 
legal and ownership structures of key economic institutions often play critical roles in the 
evolution of the macroeconomics.   
For an economy like China where the central and local governments play the 
central roles in every aspect of economy, the institutional economics becomes the key 
tool to understand the dynamics of macroeconomics. For example, all major banks and 
key industries are directly controlled and supervised by the central government in China.  
Even in a mature economy like US, the government still plays critical roles in 
macroeconomics. For example, after the great recession of 2008, most new mortgages are 
originated by a few government controlled entities like FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. Almost all student loans are originated by the US government. Gave rapidly 
growing of the student loan debts, there are many discussions whether the massive 
defaults of the student loan could create a new financial crisis. Because the student loans 
are largely owned the US government, massive defaults of the student loans could only 
add more to budget deficits for the federal government rather than a new financial crisis. 
If the student loans were privately owned, it would be a completely different discussion.   
Since an IBS+ model deals with the balance sheets, the ownership and legal 
structure are naturally built into the dynamics of the balance sheets. 
  
4.14 A Model Based on Sound Theoretical Foundation 
 
An IBS+ model is built on physics laws of social science and fundamental 
equation of economics. Since physics laws of social science are universal laws of 
physics, modelers don’t have worry about the theoretical foundation of an IBS+ model.  
The biggest problem of DSGE models is their shaky theoretical foundation. (1) 
DSGE models are built on neoclassical economics, which is not compatible with FEOE. 
(2) Much of modern economics is built on laws of supply and demand. Unfortunately, 
laws of supply and demand are not compatible with FEOE, they are statistical 
relationships in a sense that they work sometimes and do not work in other time, and they 
are not laws of physics. To analyze any market, indeterministic supply demand pricing 
(ISDP) model derived from FEOE works much better [5]. The framework of AS-AD and 
price stickiness is a wrong framework to study how the macroeconomics works. (3) The 
central assumption of DSGE models is that markets always return to a deterministic 
steady state or the equilibrium state. In DSGE models, by design the economy would 
never go from the equilibrium state into the disequilibrium state without external shocks. 
Therefore, by design, DSGE models cannot forecast recessions caused by endogenous 
instabilities. (4) The micro-foundation of DSGE models imposes idealized behavior on a 
few agents. A model should model the important decision making processes in the real 
economy not imposing unrealistic behavior on agents. DSGE models assume that firms 
will always maximizing profits. In the real world, for a firm to manage the balance sheet 
properly, managers must balance profits and risks. It was exactly poor risk management 
that drove Lehman Brothers into bankruptcy while the similar financial firms like 
Goldman Sach with better risk management survived.    
 The important thing is that the success of macroeconomic models like SEM and 
SFC has already proved that one does not need neoclassical, laws of supply and demand, 
the framework AS-AD and price stickiness, general equilibrium, and micro-foundation to 
model macroeconomics. These shaky and unscientific concepts not only provide no 
useful insight to modeling but also restrict models so much so that models are no longer 
universally applicable and no longer capable of capturing the true dynamics of the 
macroeconomic reality.  
Balance sheet modeling and forecasting used by an IBS+ model is not new to 
economics. On Wall Street, analysts have analyzed and modeled balance sheets on the 
daily basis for well over a hundred years. Therefore, there are vast literatures and 
intellectual heritages exiting in forecasting the future performance of balance sheets and 
default risks of individuals, companies, and governments. It is interesting to note that few 
popular macroeconomic theories are used by wall-street analysts. While macroeconomics 
is different from businesses in some ways, national accounting system makes crystal 
clear that fundamentally the behavior of macroeconomics is just the behavior of the 
aggregated balance sheet.   
 
4.15 A Model with Indeterministic Mean Reversion 
 
The important question in macroeconomic modeling is how to design long-term 
behavior of models and the terminal state of modeling. DSGE models assume that the 
economy always returns to the equilibrium steady state of growth. Deterministic SFC 
models [55] either end with a steady state of same flow of funds rates, or deterministic 
chaos defined by a set of ordinary differential equations.  
These steady states in DSGE and SFC models look artificial and unrealistic. 
Historic experience of US is that the economy tends to oscillate in repeated cycles of 
boom and bust with the indeterministic timing.  In order to be consistent with FEOE, an 
IBS+ model ends with a stable probability distribution of many possible states with 
mainly positive and some negative growth rates. The mean of probability distribution 
corresponds to the steady state of long-term average growth rate. The probability 
distribution reflects the possible range and uncertainty to pin point the economic states in 
the future.  
 
4.16 A Model Emphasizing Inventory Dynamics 
  
So far we have focused on the balance sheet view of macroeconomics. However, 
the analysis of macroeconomics is not complete without analyzing market dynamics of 
key markets like labor and money. In this section, we are taking a market-centric view of 
macroeconomics with indeterministic supply demand pricing (ISDP) models with 
emphasizing inventory dynamics. 
Inventory is one of most outstanding features of any market-based economy 
because most markets such as labor, money, housing, auto, other manufactured goods, 
and commodities carry inventories. For any market, the existence of inventory means 
supply is always greater than demand. Therefore, supply curve would never intersect with 
demand curve. And there is no such thing as marshallian cross or market equilibrium 
defined as supply equals demand. The existence of inventory undermines the entire 
framework of laws of supply and demand and market equilibrium and the general 
equilibrium theory. For these reasons, despite the fundamental importance of inventory 
for any economy, most standard textbooks in microeconomics and macroeconomics 
prefer to ignore such an awkward topics.  
FEOE rejects the general equilibrium theory. Without the framework of laws of 
supply and demand and market equilibrium, the importance of inventories determining 
the growth potential and short-term fluctuations of macroeconomics starts to emerge. 
There are many kinds of inventories in a market-based economy. In the goods 
producing part of economy, inventories include both the physical inventories and the 
spare capacities of production. In USA, the business inventory is part of national 
accounting system and a key component of GDP. Analyzing the business inventory is 
incomplete without examining the available spare capacity which is monitored by Federal 
Reserve. In the service part of economy, the unemployed labor force is one of good 
proxies of the spare capacity. Some service industries like hotels and airlines, the vacancy 
rates are available for analysis. The unemployment rate is a direct measure of inventory 
of the labor supply. In the money market, the existence of cash can be viewed as a form 
of inventory of money for potential investments. When demand exceeds supply, the 
waiting lists are created. In a market-based economy, the waiting lists do exist but not 
very common. Interestingly, in a centrally planned economy, the waiting lists are 
everywhere.     
The central tenet of traditional macroeconomic models is the general equilibrium 
defined as aggregate supply equals to aggregate demand and saving equals investment. 
However, in a real market-based economy, because the existence of inventories, the 
aggregate supply is always greater than aggregate demand, labor supply is always greater 
than labor demand, and saving is always greater than investment, many macroeconomic 
models based on the concept of the market equilibrium become out of touch with the 
economic reality.  
Inventory dynamics turns out to be the key to understand the many dynamics of 
macroeconomics. For example, there is a strong causality relationship between the 
inflation rates and the inventory, spare capacity, and unemployment rates. The recession 
of 2001 was largely due to too much inventory and spare capacity built up in high-tech 
and telecom industries. The housing inventory and especially the distressed housing 
inventory played key roles in the dynamics of US macroeconomics during the great 
recession of 2008.  
One of most important empirical observations in macroeconomics is the Philips 
Curve, which represents the relationship between the inflation rate and the unemployment 
rate. The Philips Curve is the direct result of the inventory dynamics in the economy. 
Therefore, ignoring the important inventory dynamics would make any macroeconomic 
model superficial. 
In an IBS+ model, the inventory is the bridge between the primary balance sheet 
view and the secondary market-centric view of macroeconomics, because inventories, 
spare capacity, and cash are important parts of balance sheets and carefully managed by 
owners the balance sheets.   
In conclusion, when applying FEOE to macroeconomics, inventory becomes one 
of the most important concepts of macroeconomics. A good macroeconomic model must 
be built upon the analyzing inventory dynamics of labor, money, physical inventories of 
finished products, and spare capacity under the framework of indeterministic future 
aggregate balance sheets.  
 
4.17 How to Fix DSGE and ACE Models  
 
DSGE models have their own strength and weakness. To fix DSGE models is to 
expend or preserve their strength and eliminate their weakness.  
The strength of DSGE models includes the following: (1) the accounting view of 
the initial state of the economy, which allows DSGE models to start out with empirical 
data. This is a big improvement over other equilibrium models; (2) the successful 
marketing strategy, which enables DSGE models to dominate the macroeconomic 
landscape. These models assume that economy always returns to stable steady growth 
states with policy actions might accelerate or delay the process. This feature has great 
appeals to politicians and central bankers who would like to “test” their policy ideas. This 
marketing strategy is essentially the same as the magic snake oil, which promises its 
usage would return any sick patient to the steady health state. As a marketing tool, snake 
oil has worked wonder for thousands of years around the world. Also DSGE models 
combines many different schools of thoughts like classical, neoclassical, new classical, 
Keynesian, new Keynesian, monetarism, mnand new neo-Keynesian. By making so many 
friends in high places, and dressing up models in fancy mathematics, these models have 
become the state of arts of macroeconomics. 
The weakness of DSGE models is their macroeconomic theories. With heavy 
burden of many poor theoretical ideas and limited empirical sector data, in essence, 
DSGE models are just over-parameterized extrapolation models. Like any over-
parameterized model, it fits empirical data wonderfully but forecasts the future poorly. 
That is what exactly has happened in recent years. With almost no support from 
macroeconomic theories, SEM and SFC models performed much better than DSGE 
models.  
In science, theories are only as good as their forecasts. We have to abandon those 
macro theories that are incompatible with FEOE. However, after replacing these macro 
theories with FEOE, DSGE models became essentially IBS+ models.  
Agent-based computational economic (ACE) models have been often promoted 
[25] as creditable alternatives to DSGE models. There is no doubt that computer 
simulation is a proven tool in statistical physics and chemistry. However, in statistical 
physics and chemistry, computer simulation has been successfully used in systems with 
homogenous agents and simple weak interactions. From the balance sheet point of view, 
macroeconomics consists of heterogeneous agents with strong and complicated business 
interactions. For example, during the great recession of 2008, tiny subprime mortgages 
borrowers brought down small subprime lenders first. Then the shutdown of subprime 
refinancing led to massive new defaults of subprime mortgages, and subprime CDO 
AAA-rated tranches became worthless. Financial giants like AIG who provided financial 
guaranteed of CDO tranches asked government’s help to stay alive. The sizes of balance 
sheets of AIG, subprime lenders, and subprime borrowers cannot be more different. The 
interactions among them were so complicated that only few most careful financial experts 
would have noticed that AIG actually guaranteed billions of subprime CDO tranches 
because at any moment AIG had millions of other insurance policies for individuals and 
businesses all over the world. Therefore, despite their successes in statistical physics and 
chemistry, ACE models are not very useful when dealing with in-homogenous agents 
with strong and complicated business interactions in macroeconomics.  However, the 
computer numerical techniques will be certainly used in most macroeconomic forecasting 
models including IBS+ models. In essence, ACE models take an agent-centric view of 
the macroeconomics, if those agents are the owners of balance sheets, ACE models could 




We have presented the structure and features of an IBS+ model. With side-by-side 
comparison with DSGE models, we have proved that an IBS+ model is superior in many 
ways. However, the IBS+ model is so new that it remains to see whether an IBS+ model 
is able to achieve what have achieved by a DSGE model.  
Attempting to model short-term macroeconomic fluctuations by ignoring 
inventory, debt, financial derivatives, asset bubbles, over-investments, and risk 
management, macro models like DSGE are taking a wrong path to look for fish on trees.  
In the general framework of FEOE, people are the least predictable because they 
have free wills, the economic reality captured by the balance sheets are the most 
predictable because physical assets like factories and houses change slow and relatively 
predictably, and the markets are somewhat predictable because markets combines the 
people with free wills and market economic reality independent of human free wills. 
Therefore, from the experience of modeling the behavior of corporations over last 
hundred years, the primary focus is always on the dynamics of the corporate balance 
sheets with additional analysis on the market forces and corporation managements. In 
macroeconomics, it should be no different. The primary view of the macroeconomics 
should always be the dynamics of the aggregate balance sheets. The market-centric view 
is secondary, and the agent-centric view is even more marginal. 
The balance sheets of many modern global corporations like Apple, Toyota, JP 
Morgan, Samsung, and Exxon are bigger than the aggregate balance sheets of many small 
countries. Therefore, there is no reason why balance sheets analysis, which has been 
applies to corporations so successfully over a century, could not be applies to 
macroeconomics. 
 
5 A Classification of Causes of Economic Crises 
l  
In this section, we will build an IBS+ model to analyze the causes of economic 
crises as one of applications of an IBS+ model. Every economic crisis is unique. 
However, the IBS+ model is universally applicable. 
Economic crises [56-57] have plagued humanity since the dawn of capitalism. 
Despite intense studies over last several hundred years, the questions about causes, 
forecasting, and prevention of economic crises remains unsolved. Despite almost every 
professional economist has just lived through and witnessed every detail of the Great 
Recession of 2008, yet causes of this most recent recession has become very 
controversial. The reason of failure for economists to reach a consensus about causes of 
the great recession of 2008 is that current mainstream economics does not provide a 
reliable, value free, and universal framework to analyze and explain past economic 
events. For example, DSGE models treat the great recession as an external shock to 
otherwise the equilibrium economy. Thus by definition, DSGE models could not offer 
any insight about causes and forecast of the great recession.  
We start with the debates on the causes of the great recession of 2008. Then we 
reformat the question what causes economic crises into a value free and scientific 
forecasting question. Then we will build an IBS+ model and formulate a classification of 
causes of economic crises.  
 
5.1 Debates on Causes of the Great Recession of 2008 
 
The causes of the great recession of 2008 have been in the front pages of 
newspapers, magzines, and research reports ever since the start of the recession. It is 
remarkable that given more or less the same set of facts, people drew all kinds of 
conclusions. Even the official Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission could not reach a 
unanimous conclusion.  
The reason for so many different opinions is that the research on what caused the 
great recession depends on the purpose of your research, the way you analyze the 
economy, the data set you use, the economic theories and analytical tools  you use, and 
the time frame you focus on. The historic facts are events happened in 4-dimensional 
time and space. In social science, these historic events are chained in an indeterministic 
way. In order to make sense of the complicated historic reality, we are forced to make 
simplified mental models to focus on just things we are interested in. Therefore, although 
historic data are the same, our simplified mental models are very different. For example, 
if one would like to learn a monetary policy lesson, one could conclude that Federal 
Reserve kept the low interest rates too long between 2002 and 2004, which fueled the 
housing bubbles.  If one would like to learn a mortgage underwriting lesson, one could 
conclude that the poor mortgage underwriting was a major cause of the recession.  
Since economics is fundamentally a forecasting science like physics, this paper is 
focused on learn a lesson on how to forecast a recession in advance. By focusing on 
forecasting a recession by an econometric model, it is a science and becomes a value-free 
approach, which is theoretically independent of personal opinions. Also this paper took a 
balance-sheet-centric view of the economy. We further limit causes mainly to 
quantifiable balance sheet data from historic national accounting and corporate financial 
filings. Since macroeconomic events are indeterministic, we limit the time period 2 to 4 
quarters before the official start date of the recession. In order to organize all these 
relevant information together in a coherent way, we need to build an IBS+ forecasting 
model.  
 
5.2 Build an IBS+ Recession Forecasting Model and a Universal 
Leading Economic Indicator 
 
To build an IBS+ model for the recession forecasting is straight forwards. For 
defined a recession simply as an economic event with the negative GDP growth for two 
or more consecutive quarters. The model only forecasts the probability of a recession in 2 
to 4 quarters into the future, which is the essentially tail risk of the future GDP growth 
rate while ignoring all other probability distributions. 
 In terms of sector choices, we scan all sectors of the economy to identify possible 
trouble sectors, evaluate their potential impacts on the future GDP growth, and quantified 
their contributions to the probability of recession. 
To put in a mathematical equation, we use the logistic regression formulation to 








Where 𝑃 is the probability of a recession, n the total number of trouble sectors we 
identified, 𝐶𝑖 the contribution from the sector i measured by the natural logarithm of the 
odds, and 𝑆𝑖 the relative sector size of contributing to GDP for the sector i. 
The holy grail of the business cycle research is to develop reliable leading 
indicators that could forecast the coming recessions. In essence, the tail risk 𝑃 is the 
abstract universal leading indicator that forecasts the recession from an IBS+ model. The 
tail risk 𝑃 is a purely economic indicator, and closely related with financial indicators like 
the stock market index and the slope of yield curve. One problem of existing leading 
indicators is the false positives. The tail risk 𝑃 solving the false positive problem by using 
probability, which is required by physics laws of social science and reflects the 
indeterministic nature of macroeconomics. 
 
5.3 An Classification of Causes of Economic Crises 
 
Because the IBS+ model for recession forecasting is universally applicable to any 
economy through history, we can use this model to classify causes of all historic 
recessions in a consistent way. The hypothesis is that recessions belonging to the same 
class have the same causes, the similar economic dynamics, and the similar of potential 
policy prescription. In medicine, the classification of diseases is central for diagnose and 
treatment. From the physics point of view, the balance sheets in economy and the human 
bodies are very similar because both of them are dissipative structures requiring the 
careful management to stay healthy. 
The proper management of the balance sheet can be very challenging. Every year 
in US, there are millions of household and thousands of companies filing for bankruptcy.  
During the great recession of 2008, although financial giants like Lehman Brothers and 
AIG had employed thousands of risk management professionals with the best talents 
available in the world, these firms still managed to get into big troubles.  
There are 5 types of potential problems for a balance sheet: asset devaluation, 
rising debt, drop of income, rising costs, and short-term liquidity crisis.  Asset 
devaluation and rising debt will result in insolvency. The drop of income and rising cost 
will deplete the savings. The sudden changes of flow of funds in an economy like 
government expenses cutting after a major war are captured by the changes of income 
and expenses flows. The short-term liquidity crisis is the inability to pay bills in cash 
even though the balance sheet could be solvent. The mismanagement of asset, debt, 
income, expenses, and liquidity will cause economic troubles. The proper management of 
a balance sheet also must include the proper risk management for unexpected shocks and 
surprises.  
In essence, the management of a balance sheet requires the financial disciplines, 
which often are found missing for many individuals, businesses, and governments. 
Normally the mismanagement of balance sheets by households, businesses, and 
governments has no severe macroeconomic consequence. The market economy like US is 
so big that it is very resilient to small shocks because losses more than 1% of GDP in a 
quarter are very rare. However, occasionally the mismanagement of balance sheets does 
get out of control and starts the vicious cycles of recession. 
Because a recession by definition is an accounting event, it could always be traced 
troubles back to mismanagement of balance sheets and sudden changes of flow of funds. 
However, sometimes causes of recessions are better assigned to the exogenous natural 
and man-made shocks. For example, the recent US congressional failure to raise debt 
ceiling could create a recession. It makes more senses to classify the cause as a political 
decision instead of calling the mismanagement of government debt. Whenever in doubt, 
we simple assign the blame on mismanagement of balance sheets. For example, many 
people believe that repeal of Glass-Steagall Act caused the recent financial crisis. 
Although the repeal of Glass-Steagall certainly made financial firms more complex, we 
still assign the mismanagement of financial firms as causes of recession for the simplicity 
of the classification. In theory at least, a recession could happen without obvious 
mismanagement of balance sheets especially in countries like Japan where the economic 
growth is very weak and the population is aging rapidly or shrinking. 
The simple classification is summarized in the following:  
 
Exogenous Shocks: 
 Natural Causes 
  Earthquake 
  Epidemic diseases 
 Man-made Causes 
  Wars 
  Monetary policy 
  Fiscal policy 
  Currency policy 
  Other political decisions 
Endogenous Balance Sheet Mismanagement 
 Households/Financials/Other Firms/Governments 
  Asset devaluation 
  Burden of debt and obligations 
  Reduction of income 
  Rise of expenses 
  Liquidity Crisis      
  Many recessions in history are caused by endogenous factors, which are the 
factors captured by the national account system and flow of funds. The recession 2001 
recession was mainly caused by mismanagement of inventories and over-investment by 
high-tech and telecomm companies. The saving and the loan banking crisis and the sharp 
oil price rise before the first gulf war mainly caused the 1990 recession. Between 1836 
recession and the great depression of 1929, the economic crises were often associated 
with banking panics. Bank and other financial firms were often highly leveraged 
institutions with concentrated financial assets like marketable securities, mortgages, 
loans, credit lines, and Guarantees. It was only after the creation of FDIC in 1933, the 
panic bank runs were replaced by the orderly bank took over by FDIC.  
Some recessions in US were caused by exogenous factors like wars. Post war 
spending cuts often forced the economy to adjust structurally in terms of labor forces and 
production. For example, World War I recession in 1918, recession of 1945 after World 
War II, and recession of 1953 after the Korean War. Post war spending cuts also played 
roles in 1973 recession after the Vietnam War.  
It will be interesting to apply the classification presented above to study 
systematically the historic economic crises worldwide. It will be followed up by the 
future researches.  
 
5.4 Causes of the Great Recession of 2008 
 
In this section, we will apply the IBS+ model to build a qualitative forecasting 
model at the end of 2006 to estimate the recession probability one year ahead. 
The choice of sectors is mainly based on the sector sensitivity to the housing 
market because the US housing market was peaked in the early 2006, and the early 
payment default was rising at an alarming rate during 2006. The selection of sectors is 
listed as the following: 
 Household 
  Prime 
  Near Prime  
  Subprime 
 Financial Firms 
  Subprime Mortgage Lenders 
  Other Mortgage Lenders 
  Banks 
  Bond Insurer (AIG, MBIA, AMBAC, etc) 
  Quasi-Government Mortgage Agency 
  Other Financial Firms 
Non-Financial Firms 
  Home Builders 
Auto makers 
  Other Firms 
 Government 
  
The choice of asset and liability is also based on the sensitivity to the downturn of 
housing market. Most of information listed in the following was public information and 
can be found in company financial filings, industry publication, and government national 
accounting statistical data. 
 Households 
Asset  
Inflated Housing Price 
Equity Depleted by Home Equity Extraction 
   Liability 
    Personal Debt to GDP Record High 
Not-Affordable Mortgages    
Financial Firms     
   Asset 
    Structured Products 
     CDO, CBO, ABS, CBMS, CLO 
    Non-Agency Mortgages      
   Liability 
    Extremely high leverages for Wall Street Investment Banks  
Bond Insurance with extremely high leverages  
     AIG, MBIA, AMBAC 
    Mortgage Buyback Guarantee 
     Subprime Mortgage Lenders 
     Banks 
    Agency Mortgage Default Guarantee  
     Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac  
  Non-Financial Firms 
   Liability 
    Pension Liability 
     GM/FORD/Chysler 
   Asset    
Over-investment in Residential Structures 
 Home Builders 
 
At the end of 2006, the private household debt to GDP ratio was at an alarmingly 
high level. The household debt was dominated by the mortgage debt. The sharp rise of 
household debt was fueled by the expansion of the home ownership rates and the 
extraction of home equity through cash-out refinancing by treating the house as an “ATM 
machine”. The cash-out refinance was very common for subprime and near prime 
borrowers because mortgage lenders favored the payment-tested borrowers over the first-
time home buyers. Because the epidemic poor underwriting standard, the early payment 
default rates of subprime and near prime mortgages had been rising very rapidly through 
2006. At the end 2006, it was clear to financial markets that if the housing price failed to 
rise in the next few years, many subprime and near prime mortgages were going to 
default. The credit default swap, which is the insurance costs against default, for BBB –
rated subprime bonds reached record high at the end of 2006. Therefore, just based on 
information from the household sectors alone, the recession risk was rising rapidly in 
2006 after the peak of the US housing market because the consumer spending was 
partially supported by the home equity extraction. 
The financial firms were extremely highly leveraged at the end of 2006. For 
example, the asset to equity ratio for Lehman Brothers was about 30 to 1 according to its 
annual report. The high leveraged was very troublesome if the housing price was going to 
fall sharply because these financial firms owned trillions dollars of mortgages, mortgage 
bonds, and CDOs. The financial firms were also liable for massive mortgage related 
guarantees. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac owned or guaranteed nearly $5 trillion 
mortgages. Bond insurers including AIG, MBIA and AMBAC were insuring hundreds of 
billions of mortgage bonds and CDO tranches with extremely thin capitals. The mortgage 
lenders usually offer to buy back a mortgage if the mortgage defaults in the first six 
month. The sharp rise of the early payment defaults of subprime mortgages in the end of 
2006 push the subprime lenders like New Century into financial crises. If these subprime 
lenders were going to scale back or give up mortgage lending, the subprime mortgage 
default would rise dramatically because many borrowers were paying artificially low 
initial teasing mortgage rates by choosing so-called hybrid mortgage products. Therefore,   
the financial firms were like a ticking time bomb at the end of 2006. 
 Among non-financial firms, home builders and the housing market related 
industries were very vulnerable to a housing market downturn. Over-investment during 
the housing market boom was apparent. The auto industry was financially sick because 
the heavy burden of the pension liability. Otherwise, the corporate sectors were fairly 
healthy at the end of 2006. The stock markets were at reasonably valuation relative to 
earnings. In Government sectors, many local governments were also burden by the 
pension liability. The finance of local governments heavily depended on the real estate 
taxes, which was vulnerable to a housing market downturn. 
To summarize, causes of great recession of 2008 were mainly mismanagement of 
balance sheets by households and financial firms. Based on public available balance sheet 
information, the tail risk of a recession was rising sharply after the peak of the US 
housing markets in early 2006.  
 
5.5 Generalization of Austrian Schools’ Work on Credit, Fisher’s debt 
deflation theory, and Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
The framework of FEOE emphasizes all factors impact on the health of a balance 
sheet including credit, other liability like insurance, derivatives, and guarantees, 
inventory, asset valuation, income, expense, and liquidity. Therefore, the framework of 
FEOE of mismanagement of balance sheets can be viewed as the generalization of the 
Austrian credit cycle theories [58], Irving Fisher’s debt deflation theory [59], and 
Minsky’s financial instability theory [60-62].  
The credit cycle is the expansion and contraction for household and firms to 
access to credit in an economy. The Austrian business cycle theory [58] emphasizes 
credit extensions by financial firms and mal-investment by firms as the fundamental 
causes of short-term economic fluctuations. Irving Fisher’s debt deflation theory focuses 
on the role of deleveraging in creating busts, recessions, and depressions. Hyman Minsky 
went a step further by proposing financial instability hypothesis and emphasizing the 
endogenous instability of financial firms, which swing between robustness and fragility. 
 The credit cycle theory is criticized by mainstream economists. In the AD-AS 
framework, the credits are close to zero sum games between lenders and borrowers. Thus 
credits are irrelevant and should have no macro impacts on aggregates.  Therefore, in 
many DSGE models, credits, leverage, deleverage, defaults, and financial firms are not 
even modeled. During the great recession, instead of a macroeconomic nonevent, the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers proves to be a macroeconomic disaster. Given their 
sizes, the bankruptcy of AIG, Fannie, Freddie, or Citigroup would be even much worse 
without government financial supports.  In the FEOE framework, the bankruptcy of 
balance sheets would have ripple effects on many related players because the 
interconnection of balance sheets between lenders and borrowers and flow of funds.  
Another line of criticism of the credit cycle theory is that the theory is logically 
inconsistent with the rational choice theory because it implies that financial firms act 
irrationally: during the boom period, they extend too much credit; and during the bust, 
they withdraw too much credit. The traditional rational choice theory might not able to 
capture the scope of complexity of managing the balance sheet of financial firms. To 
manage the balance sheets properly is to maximize net value of the firms, to control 
properly the risks and liquidity, and to balance the short gains and long-term objectives. 
In the FEOE framework, because the future economy is indeterministic, the low visibility 





Because IBS+ models are universally applicable, we could apply these models to 
analyze the historic economic crises. The IBS+ approach allows the value-free 
forecasting method to analyze historic events. The tail risk of a coming recession can be 
used as the abstract universal leading indicators of a recession.  
This paper proposes a classification of causes of economic crises using IBS+ 
models to analyze balance sheets of key economic sectors. Applying this classification to 
examine recent economic crises, we conclude that most economic crises are caused by 
mismanagement of balance sheets by key economic players. This paper suggests that 
economic crises are largely caused by inevitable misbehavior of humanity and not caused 
by any fundamental flaw of capitalism. Historically, treating mismanagement of balance 
sheets as main causes of economic crises is a generalization of Austrian business cycle 
theory, Fisher’s debt deflation theory, and Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis. 
From the tail risk point of view, almost all recessions can be forecasted. In 
contrast, one key assumption of all DSGE models is that economic crises are exogenous 
shocks and cannot be forecasted within the models.  
 
6 Concluding Remarks 
 
We have applied FEOE to build an IBS+ model for macroeconomics in this paper 
and an ISDP model in an earlier paper [5] for describing the market supply, demand, and 
pricing dynamics. These two examples prove that FEOE are useful and easy to use for 
solving important economic problems. 
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